5. Post-socialist transformation of ownership.
phenomenon of transformation system of property rights in post-socialist countries is the total lack of support or at least against its privatization of the majority population. It related to the nature of the state monopoly, the so-called nationwide, and oderzhavlenoyi cooperative and collective-farm property. "Go-distinctive main links nationwide feature of the property is in the appropriation for being analyzed and results-production workers, associated (combined) in the mass Staff the whole society, "- emphasized in a recent Soviet state-dartnyh textbooks political ekonomiyi1. "Asotsiyovanist" only the most theoretical constructions they had to give everyone the opportunity to include a "co-owner of all national wealth. In fact, citizens well see the difference between full possession, disposal or use of their individual property and the absence of this public property, which was before the party-state byurokratiyi2. Confronting these two forms of ownership (as in Central Europe - even with a significant layer private property) was at naoch-nishym that, unlike the personal and private, "associated" property was neper-sonifikovanoyu, impersonal, perceived on the one hand, as something zahalnodostup-not (as air, sunlight, etc.) and the other - as being opposed to individual or the real property, Anyway, it limits the increase is strictly regulated framework of egalitarian distribution.
main direction of economic transformation system was replaced imperaty-Woo "public" ownership of private property dominated, although the ideology of the pro-making process in some countries substantially different - from complete negation preserving elements of the former "socialist" model of economic base (Central Europe, a number of post- States - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, but also Russia, Ukraine, Bishop-hyzstan) to the recognition of equal rights and private ownership of certain national-him last priority (China, Vietnam) and preserving the original clan-Oder-zhavlenoyi property (Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Belarus).
Overall can distinguish three ways of economic transition in countries postsotsialistych-making, and that led to three types of property relations today. Per-necks of them is typical for Central European and Baltic countries that most consistently and persistently carried out a break with the previous, socialist-it " period of their political, ideological and economic development. In form-ing different ownership type of market in these countries primarily affected read the following specific factors:
-especially the mentality of people, which with the weakening of the ideological foundations of socialism after the XX CPSU Congress has in 60 years last century and gradually recovered increasingly amplified targeting European values, includ-train or to a private entity type (Which is also significantly affected, security rechno, higher economic achievements of the West, especially in the social sphere). For values mentality was additional prerequisite for social consensus on development-derzhavlennya and explicitly includes the projects of reform measures that a significant layer of small and medium-sized businesses that existed in these countries peredsotsialistychni times and partly preserved under socialism;
compared with other groups in post-socialist of societies in Central Europe-language and anti-Soviet Baltic states clearly dominated (partially ototozh-efficiency, with anti-Russian) mood, which opened or immanently were larger glass-Doe political platforms of new governing structures. Fear of returning to the sphere of Russian influence was dominant support population of these structures, which pro-pechylo reduce negative reactions to the most dangerous for them "shocking" attack first years of economic reforms. Conducted in these years is unpopular and risk-ated transformation events created the necessary foundation for further accelerated the construction of market-Term Economy purely "Western" brand, which was not in post-Soviet or "eastern" (in China and Vietnam) models;
political and economic transformation CEE countries that have chosen a clear course toward integration into NATO and the EU, was under constant, very strict control on the side of the two organizations. According to Art. 6 European Association Agreements with the EU were established bodies such control - of the Association, which systematically eye-nyuvaly 'progress in implementing market economy "3 in these countries, with responsibility consumption in leading conclusions about future prospects of joining the pan-European business-sky zintehrovanoho space (this assessment led, in particular, the temporal-delay accession of Bulgaria and Romania). As post-Soviet countries, the partnership agreement and cooperation did not include such a control mechanism, although the EU and conducted its own assessment of market reforms (poshlemosya, such as negative evaluation Action Plan EU - Ukraine, issued in December 2004).
Under the influence of three factors described the process of reform in CEE countries at the beginning of the XXI century. led to the formation such property relations that we were the closest-to "civilized" western settings. In such large-scale changes in intrinsic nature of economic basis could not be a separate violation reformatsiy-tion process, but they were not systemic in nature and were largely eliminated by State law enforcement agencies. Some are national variations in the structure of property relations is outside the parameters established in the West overall para-meters, and that was classified as the basis for making most of the Cent-eral European and Baltic countries to the European Union.
In these countries represented how large stock ownership (including a significant number of Noah-minority shareholders who have invested in joint stock companies during the privatization of their ваучери), так і приватна власність середнього та малого бізнесу, що на перших порах виникла на базі використання тих самих іменних сертифікатів -ваучерів. By "western" part of the stored sample a small percentage of state ownership in some sectors (energy, transport, some of the heavy industry etc.) as well as municipal property. These countries have widely opened the doors of the national economy, not only for access to the internal market of goods and services, but primarily for importing foreign capital. There are certain differences in politics for the last-involvement: in Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, for example, priority was yentatsiya-oriented access to its manufacturing facilities (high level of FDI has caused total dependence on foreign corporations, but at so as possible with their help ut-verdytysya on world markets) in the Czech Republic and Latvia foreign capital belch-see particularly active in the banking system (90 and 70% shareholding banks, respectively) 4, through which he gained control of the economy, but also helped create a powerful financial structure (Czech "Zhyvnostensku Bank, Riga" Parex Bank, etc.).
The experience of CEE countries liberalized model of market reforms (Which sought to implement Ye.Haidar and other Russian reformers of the first wave) is possible only after the success of the original sense of "shock stroke, which allow poured-in a short period (similar - L. Erhard reforms in the late 40's in Germany) reflec-fu strong base for the following steps to have more evolutionary formation of "civilized according to Western models" of market economy. Finally, in these countries inspire dylasya base for the operation of regulated / property when the state-ton with the help of an integrated system of legal and economic levers a kind of arbiter, not the main subject of the formation and functioning property relations.
paradox for Western theorists of post-socialist transformation is that the most promising basis for economic transformation was Chinese and Vietnam-plishment of their policy implementation by stages-selective, ignoring liberal ralizatsiyi, conducting economic reforms. After the 3 rd plenum of the CPC Central Committee 11 th skly-Off (1978) in China is modernizing its economy, the principles which you have values Deng Xiaoping. From the distribution of market basis in the agricultural sector for the first-th stage of reforms (1979-1984 biennium) and the policy of expanding private forms of ownership of the second phase (1984-1994 biennium) to China for solutions XIV Congress of CPC (1994) moved to form a "socialist market economy". As emphasized in official documents at the beginning of this century has created in the original form of this economic system based on the formed structure "of the total devel-tion of various economic sectors in retaining the main role of public property. " By the year 2010 will be completed "relatively perfect system of socialist market economy-tors, and by 2020 - enough mature "system referred to 5.
distinctive feature of the reform of the economic mechanism, including property relations in China has been evolutionary, spasmodic and not (as in the other two models transformation) process of restructuring of the economic basis under strict controlled lemmas party-state vertical power. This would eliminate the privatization of public property, which, incidentally, was an important first staff still weak private forms. After strengthening their economic and legal levers provided conditions for all these forms of self-development, growth performance which now exceeds corresponding dynamic state property 6. On the successful outcome of the ownership reform in China show such facts as high (8-10%) rates GDP growth, annual revenues exceeding $ 50 billion. direct to foreign investment, accelerating growth of high technology exports (in 2002 - at 46.1% against 22.3% increase in total exports), etc. 7.
Dvosektorna, limited state and cooperative ownership structure of the economy's intensive at the beginning of this century turned into multy system, the basic elements of which-we are such ownership:
State, which still occupies the leading place. Companies working on the new OS policy targets or government order, with gradual market orientation. At the same time seeks to create such an economic mechanism in this sector, which is not selective, and fully meet the needs of the market economy;
Cooperative stimulated state to work in market conditions;
individual property artisanal labor, artisans, etc., which are mainly for the needs of local markets but partly involved in the export rates in traditional and simple products;
pryvatnokapitalistychna personal property in a small, and average ve-chip business, using the labor of hired workers. State administrative but not limiting its development, but regulates the activity Owners using the special regulations concerning the functioning of enterprises, means of economic control, etc.;
stock ownership various types, including state participation (mixed enterprises with a large share derzhvkladen appear in Chinese statistics along with state property) with foreign investments and so on.;
property wholly owned by foreigners. It operates mainly in special economic zones in the east and south, by the end of last century and was associated mainly with attachments Capital huatsyao - Ethni-rical overseas Chinese, and last added years of large investment TNCs.
Bahatoukladnist economic growth nesuspilnoyi share ownership does not mean the absence of saw-yut control over economic activities of all sectors of the party-state apparatus. In the future, aims to "transform government functions in the management economy, create the perfect system makrokontrolyu, head-in which we will be indirect control methods "8, which apparently has nothing to do th with "Western" model of minimal state intervention in economic life.
In its main features coincides with the Chinese and Catalan model formation of a mixed economy-class. The main thing in it is also a selective policy of the party-state apparatus to different forms of ownership while maintaining leading role of state-state sector, supporting small and medium business (including as an important factor counteracting unemployment), ensuring for preferential treatment to foreign investors.
Permanent, Diversified (sectoral and territorial) control of the couples will be constantly-state staff to identify in these two countries the presence of administrative tive-controlled property.
process of market reforms in post "Newly independent states" (ie it except the Baltic republics, which immediately chose tsentralnoyevropey-sky "development path) inherent Significant differences in the conceptual premise and practice of their implementation - from attempts to use the most liberalized model of natural transformations at the initial stage of transformation in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, cha-stkovo - in Ukraine to maintain tight administrative directive-model State-podaryuvannya Turkmenistan and weakened somewhat of the same model last decade in Belarus, with their broad diversification restrictions on ownership of forms. At the same time for all these countries, some common features characteristic of the first transformation process, which distinguish it from the other two models of market reform - a centralized ralnoyevropeyskoyi " and shidnoyi1. First of all it concerns the "clan" method of denationalization, when representatives of political or politically mixed family clans in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova or predominantly tribal structures - ages CE Asia and Azerbaijan were able to distribute in their favor basic infrastructural facilities, you Former public property. The natural consequence of this approach in several countries (especially Russia and Ukraine) were considerable problems with proshar-ku SME, focus on the development of which was nearly full-Stu excluded from the model of voucher privatization. Natural occurrence during trans-formation of a wide sector of the business in Muslim countries not associated with specific methods of its creation, as in China or CEE but rather with traditional mental factors. Gradual growth is small businesses in other CIS countries has become a fact only in recent years. Common and such effects is the transformation of property relations, as a failure of its current structure to provide for the priority of national self economy - large or even re-pumpkin share of GDP in these countries (especially Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, no, Kazakhstan) associated with the export energy, commodities and semi-finished products to the world market.
In most Central Asian countries (the least - in Kazakhstan, with its equal num-styamy indigenous and Russian-speaking population) and in Azerbaijan significant impact on the transformation processes kept the specific mental and religious factors. For example, in Uzbekistan was not introduced private ownership of land, keeping rehlasya-state monopoly of foreign trade activities, which proved norms of Muslim traditions 9. The feature was a specific system of Azerbaijan origin of managerial ownership, which existed informally for ra-Soviet era, when the director of the company was actually already own it, and as well as full-dependent economy from the performance State oil company winning the Azerbaijan Republic, which poryadkuvav Aliyev clan. In this country, as in Central Asian countries, particularly important мав якраз родинно-клановий прин­цип роздержавлення власності: в Казахстані - між представниками старшого, середнього і молодшого жусів, в Узбекистані - Mostly among immigrants from the Tashkent clan Karimov and others. Family business was also typical of the period of leadership of Georgia E. Shevardnadze, for Kyrgyzstan - with A. Akaev, not to mention a monopolization of the Turkmen economy.
Although specific features, all transformation model of post-Soviet space were carried out under the undeniable influence of the base model, peo-tion in Russia, which was also the closest model of reform Property in Ukraine, where she vtilyuvalasya in life with a certain lag. Therefore, the main features of the clearest and specific transformation process on this space can be explored is the example of Russia, although such a huge, multi-country only and exclusively liberal model of reform is not justified.
Privatization in Russia was conducted in two phases - the voucher (1992-1994 biennium) and money (mostly completed in 1995-1997). After the 1998 financial crisis Russia is gradually drawn into the next stage - the restructuring of ownership, which features clearly manifest themselves after 2000, with the election of President W. Pu-Tin. This periodization slightly different from the proposed RF Audit Chamber, which refers to the third stage of 1999-2003 he and describing him as the "the improvement of the legal principles-ing disposal of public property 10. This definition is not clear limitation of his subject only to the State Property, as well as temporal and-below 2003 - allegedly after it has come a new phase of policy changes, or by ownership relations, which in practice is not observed.
To characterize current system of property rights in Russia (as well as in Ukraine) is particularly important to transform it into the first stage, when formed most essential differences in the relationship property compared with the other two transformation models. Voucher privatization by model A. Chubais was formally identical with the same name privatization in Central Europe. Low price-wow cheriv (10 rubles.) Prevented use them to create their own business or participate in shareholders' capital of large commercial facilities. Along with such vouchers bezimennistyu low price promoted their rapid alienation in favor of rapidly formed trusts or management of commercial facilities. Thus, already at tso th stage was laid the foundation for a sharp differentiation of the owners - the oligarchs and hard to re- mass of the population, no real opportunity to get the former share knowledges "nationwide" property.
feature of Russian and Ukrainian models were the privatization of its purposefully-ed "openness" to a narrow circle of people close to power, as well as direct interference in the distribution of property supply whole vertical bureaucracy, leading to a "feudal" principle of allocation of property: most items were re-data for a song close to the family of the first president of Russia Boris Yeltsin future oligarchs, as distributed profitable on a regional level them and local administrations. In Ukraine, there were similar processes, and on the most objects they have increased in recent years presidency L. Kuchma-mi. As a result, Russia (to a lesser extent - for Ukraine) characterized by a high level of monopolization of ownership, which until recently an administrative guarded for large business units of central government efforts, the less important items - the efforts of regional or departmental leadership. It concerns first of these forms of ownership as:
-property state monopoly (Gazprom, RAO UES, MIC) in the Russian Fe-deratsiyi. In Ukraine through lack of appropriate high-yield-pryrodnomonopol these objects to such property owned by GIC and some of the energy sector;
- oligarchs monopolistic property, which "nadilyalysya" persons close to them state-lords and clans which in specific terms of increased profitability of export-ment and banking sector is concentrated mainly in these areas of economic activity (this applies to "economic empires" R. Abramovich, M. Friedman - in Russia, R. Akhmetov Victor Pinchuk - in Ukraine, etc.);
regionally or sector-monopoly ownership, which is especially manifested were generated in the national republics (eg, in Bashkortostan) and some other territorial-administrative units rialno (in Primorye, Sverdlovsk region, Dnepropetrovsk respiratory exercises during Lazarenko now or in Donetsk, etc.) as well as in food and low-struction industries in both countries;
managerial-monopoly ownership by non-governmental structures would not have former "red directors" of the Soviet economy's largest facilities-tors (E. Kadannykov on weight in Russia, leaders of several major facilities, including metallurgy, chemical plants and hiynyh in Ukraine and others.);
criminal monopoly ownership, which in 90 years of strictly protected Mafia structure and which is now superseded or (good example - the elimination of the aluminum business A. Bykov after his prosecution) or legalized.
significantly influence administrative resources, to other forms of property, or which have been preserved in transformed during the economic reforms. These include:
kvazikooperatyvnu property, preserved features of Soviet collective farms vnasli Docking absence of private property land;
property of participants small and medium businesses, especially suffers from local administrative bodies and slightly expanding its participation in the national economy in recent years;
municipal property, due in particular to the experience of Moscow or Kyiv largely personified bureaucrats through the use and orders of her-tion;
Finally, foreign ownership of business entities which unanimously celebrated-SPOT high dependency of the business from authorities.
In recent years, Russia has started a process of de-monopolization of state ownership of (including RAO UES) and some oligarchic structures. The liquidation of the corporation in Russia Yukos M. Khodorkovsky, offensive Ukrainian governments on their political property opponents (re sale of Kryvorizhstal, etc.) giving rise to some general conclusions. First of all, we are not talking so much about de-, how much redistribution of property in favor of new pryvladnyh structures. A head-not - in these cases the administrative resource was activated selectively only on separate, undesirable for political reasons, the oligarchs. Indirectly to all of these re-sliduvan was to show the rest of big capital earned in the first period of transformation, that their weakness against power, which results only from the for-upgrade system compliance with the legal principles of their property, and is actually a result of the agreements with the previous power structures.
If you give a comparative description of property relations in post-m space of the "Central" or "eastern" model, it can be seen as well-in common dominant influence on the functioning of the administrative these relations-son in all the countries - members of CIS. This effect occurs at all levels of power vertical in all areas of economic activity, with informal exceeded-ing the use of administrative resources on legal principles of its control. Therefore, unlike other post-socialist model of функціонування, дана економічна категорія на теренах цього регіону світу може бути охарактеризована як типово адміністративно-залежна форма власності, with all negative as-bake their manifestation and development.
"Formal privatization and transfer of control over the property in private hands did not result to achieve the objectives identified in the State Programme of privatization-tion, - of "efficient owner" and a socially oriented market economy "11 - this conclusion RF Audit Chamber rightly be attributed to the transformation process not only in Russia, all ayv other newly independent states that emerged post-Soviet space.
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